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This essay distinguishes between empirical (ordinary, factual) and transcendental 
(metaphysical) forms of guilt, applied to the issue of death and mortality. Guilt in 
the transcendental sense is deeply related to the fundamental question about the 
meaningfulness of human life, including the meaningfulness or significance of 
morality, in particular; our mortality may be seen as challenging this significance at 
the most fundamental level. Reactions to this issue by philosophers such as Mark 
Johnston and Merold Westphal will be critically considered. In addition, the relations 
between the transcendental account of guilt and some other concepts open to a 
transcendental treatment will be discussed. Finally, the horizon of guilt is connected 
with another question of philosophical thanatology, namely that concerning our 
fundamental equality (vs. inequality) in the face of death.
Three Kinds of Guilt
The starting point of this inquiry is a certain kind of conception of ethics, which 
I can here only rather programmatically state instead of directly arguing for – 
while hoping that this essay as a whole will function as an indirect argument for 
its plausibility. According to this conception, ethics is not primarily about the good 
life or about the legitimacy of moral principles. Rather, ethics, pretty much like 
religion, presumably exists in the first place because we die, because we suffer, 
and because there is a lot of evil in the world. A certain kind of “negativity” is, in this 
sense, a key to morality, and the ethics of death and dying needs to be studied – 
not exclusively, to be sure, but perhaps primarily – from the perspective of negative 
moral concepts, such as the concept of guilt.
I want to suggest that we ought to distinguish between (at least) three quite 
different ways in which death and guilt are conceptually – and, hence, ethically 
– connected in our lives, moving from the more ordinary (empirical) to the more 
metaphysical (or, in a sense to be specified in due course, “transcendental”). 
These kinds of guilt overlap with one another; they can be placed on a continuum, 
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rather than being in all imaginable cases sharply distinguishable in terms of some 
essentialist criteria. Yet, the threefold distinction plays a heuristic role and is, though 
not exhaustive, I hope illustrative:
(1) There are, obviously, factual (empirical, ordinary) forms of guilt based on 
our causing death(s) by, e.g., killing other human beings.1 This category includes 
causing deaths by means of omission, assuming that omissions are actions of 
some kind: when, for instance, we fail to provide a sick person with medicine, we 
may cause her/his death precisely by not doing something that ought to have been 
done in order to save her/his life.2 These forms of guilt invoke a number of important 
applications to special topics in applied ethics, such as abortion, euthanasia, and 
war.
(2) However, in addition to the first category that is perhaps too obvious even 
to be mentioned, there is another form of guilt connected with the topic of death, 
namely, guilt based on our not having done something with or to someone during 
her/his life, i.e., before her/his death. This is, accordingly, a form of guilt resulting 
from our failure to be sufficiently strongly present or “available” in another person’s 
life. This form of guilt should be distinguished from the guilt resulting from our failure 
to do something specific, e.g., to save a life; it is based on a more general kind of 
omission. Yet, ultimately this form of guilt may be reducible to ordinary factual guilt, 
insofar as all omissions are understood as actions. A general failure to be present 
might be regarded as a very long conjunction of particular omissions.
(3) Finally, more importantly for my purposes here, there is something like 
guilt based on one’s life as a whole, on our life being fundamentally wrong or 
questionable.3 I see this as a qualitatively different kind of guilt in comparison to 
(1) and (2); hence my choice of the vocabulary of the “transcendental” – keeping 
in mind the overlaps acknowledged above, hence the impossibility of sharply, or 
essentialistically, distinguishing between the transcendental and the empirical. 
This metaphysical or transcendental guilt4 can be compared to the guilt of the 
innocent Oedipus, for instance. Oedipus is guilty of a horrible action which he had 
tried to avoid but, given his tragic fate, could not escape. It may also come close 
to the guilt felt by, say, Holocaust survivors, or the survivors of other genocides 
and mass murders. A survivor may ask why s/he was saved while so many others 
died. Hence, transcendental guilt should also be further connected with the ethics 
of memory, our duty to remember, and the guilt possibly involved in remembering 
certain horrible events of history – or, perhaps worse, in our inevitable failures to 
1 I will be concerned with human mortality in this essay and will therefore set aside issues 
concerning animal deaths.
2 Conversely, of course, we may, by omitting a possible act of euthanasia or suicide-assistance, 
cause unbearable pain and suffering to someone who wishes to die but is not able or allowed to.
3 Cf., e.g., Merold Westphal’s (1984) analysis of something like this form of guilt as represented in 
Tolstoy’s famous short novel, The Death of Ivan Ilyich. I will return to Westphal’s views below.
4 See Pihlström 2011. 
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remember – even if we never did anything particular ourselves, or even if we were 
not even born when such events took place.5
I will try to philosophically illuminate the deep link between death and guilt by 
considering the third form of guilt, in particular. This essay can partly be read as an 
attempt to apply to the specific issue of death and mortality certain considerations 
on transcendental guilt in general that are available in a previous work of mine.6 
More importantly, it should, however, be read as an attempt to refocus the philosophy 
of death and mortality: the issue of guilt is unfortunately often only incompletely 
addressed in mainstream “philosophical thanatology.” Insofar as both death and 
guilt lead us to consider fundamental issues of human finitude, the integration of 
these concepts deserves detailed attention.
When speaking of “transcendental” concepts, or transcendental uses of concepts 
such as guilt, I am approaching my topic in a Kantian context, while avoiding (here) 
any Kant scholarship. The “transcendental” here denotes something that concerns 
the necessary conditions for the possibility of, and thus also the limits of, certain 
humanly possible (because actual) experiences and practices, such as morality (or 
what we may call the moral point of view). The transcendental, in brief, provides 
a context constitutively necessary for empirically possible – including of course 
factual – phenomena. Whether, and in what sense, such a use of a Kantian-like 
vocabulary is helpful or legitimate here will, I hope, emerge in the course of my 
inquiry. I am proposing this vocabulary as an illuminative way of dealing with the 
issue of death and guilt, instead of suggesting that these issues should always be 
approached transcendentally.
Special topics that could be discussed from the perspective of the transcendental 
vs. empirical/factual distinction include (among others) the following, the ongoing 
discourse on each containing a distinctive element of guilt but each (in its received 
form) typically ignoring the full-blown transcendental aspect of the problem of death 
and guilt: (i) moral nihilism, as opposed to the appreciation of the fundamental 
importance of morality – and the possible survival of “the good”;7 (ii) suicide – 
recalling Albert Camus’s famous question: Why doesn’t everyone commit suicide, 
given that the world is absurd? – and (iii) the ethics of memory.8 I cannot discuss 
these topics comprehensively in a single paper, but I will try to show through brief 
exemplary discussions how this theme should in my view be approached.
5 Another possible formulation of this concept of guilt is Heidegger’s concept of 
Schuldenwerdenkönnen: according to Heidegger, the human Dasein is guilty “authentically” (see, 
e.g., Heidegger 1961 (1927), 287, 333-334). I am indebted to Leena Kaunonen’s paper presented 
at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies Death and Emotions symposium (November 2011) 
for a reading of Heidegger along these lines, in the context of Eeva-Liisa Manner’s Heideggerian 
influences.
6 Pihlström 2011.
7 Cf. Johnston 2010.
8 See Margalit 2002.
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Whose Guilt: The Transcendental Subject Revisited
The transcendental vs. empirical distinction is clearly not unique to the phenomenon 
of guilt. There can be analogous accounts of other death-related emotions. Fear, 
hope, and other emotions relevant to our mortality may also be available both 
in their ordinary (or factual) and transcendental versions. When these emotions 
are discussed in relation to, for example, the Epicurean controversy regarding 
the question whether it is irrational to fear death, the relevant notions are usually 
employed in their ordinary or factual sense,9 though occasionally such discussions 
may be enriched by transcendental considerations drawn from the Kantian and 
existentialist traditions.10
 The problem of the transcendental subject inevitably arises here: whose 
emotions are we talking about when investigating (say) death and guilt? Am I, in 
addition to being (or having) an ordinary psychological self with a flesh-and-blood 
body in the empirical world, also a transcendental self, or do I perhaps “have” 
one? (And if so, who would this “I” be?)11 This issue needs to be settled in some 
way, as transcendental guilt, in particular, can hardly be ascribed to the ordinary 
empirical, factual self. This issue might be seen as a version of “the paradox of 
subjectivity” – our need to view ourselves as both empirical objects in nature and 
(transcendentally) as subjects to whom the natural world is given – discussed in 
the phenomenological tradition.12 It is typical of non-transcendental philosophers 
to avoid such complications – for better or worse. Richard Sorabji, for instance, 
completely ignores the transcendental aspect of the issue of subjectivity, despite 
his otherwise extremely detailed and comprehensive discussion of the history of 
the concept of a self and its current relevance for understanding personal identity 
and death.13
The basic view I am proposing is close to what I attempted to articulate in my 
Transcendental Guilt (2011): (i) the irreducibility, superiority, and “overridingness” 
of the ethical point of view in comparison to other perspectives on the world (e.g., 
scientific, religious, political, economic) that we may adopt within different human 
practices, (ii) the necessary role played by (potential) guilt in constituting this point 
of view (or its very possibility), and (iii) the deep, mutually constitutive relation 
between guilt and mortality must all be taken extremely seriously when we reflect 
9 See, e.g., Nagel 1979; Sorabji 2006.
10 Schumacher 2010.
11 The metaphysics of the transcendental self is an extremely complex, and perhaps paradoxical, 
matter. While there is no way such issues could be settled here, let me note that Carr’s (1999) work 
on the “paradox of subjectivity” is one of my points of departure, though only implicit here (cf. also 
Pihlström 2003).
12 Cf. Carr 1999.
13 Sorabji 2006.
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on the challenge mortality poses to our ethical relations to each other and to the 
world we live in.14 
Furthermore, there is a sense in which a certain kind of solipsism – “transcendental 
solipsism,” as we may say – emerges as a philosophical framework for any properly 
transcendental inquiry into the significance of human mortality. Both death and guilt 
are fundamentally my problems, primarily concerning not the mind-independent 
world but, rather, the world as “limited” by my transcendental subjectivity.15 This 
does not mean that I am a solipsist, or that I would be urging any transcendental 
investigator of death and mortality (or guilt) to be one – or that a solipsist (in this 
transcendental sense) would in any sense ignore the ordinary, everyday reality of 
other people. Rather, I am making a methodological point – without subscribing 
to a sharp dichotomy between methodological and “real” solipsism, either. What 
I mean is that the distinctive nature of the transcendental method, in the sense in 
which such a method has been employed in the philosophical tradition by thinkers 
such as Kant and Wittgenstein, requires, when applied to this special case, that 
we examine the meaning (or the lack of meaning) of the life, or lifeworld, limited by 
mortality from within those limits that our mortal condition itself sets us. This view is 
an explication of the cryptic remarks on the metaphysical (transcendental) subject 
as a “limit of the world” in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.16 I am not here hoping to offer 
a correct interpretation of Wittgenstein, but I do think that our understanding of the 
Tractatus may be enhanced by reading Wittgenstein in the light of a transcendental 
philosophy of death and mortality.
The Survival of the Good?
At this point, I will digress from the explicit topic of guilt for a moment in order 
to explain why Mark Johnston’s ingenious theory of the “survival of the good,” 
as developed in his Surviving Death (2010), is in my view insufficient, given the 
deep entanglement of death and guilt. Johnston is, for the purposes of this paper, 
interesting not primarily because he would offer correct answers to our questions 
regarding the relations between death and moral emotions like guilt – indeed, his 
theory is highly problematic – but rather because he is asking the right question, 
14 I cannot here argue for these views in any detail; I am basically applying the considerations of my 
2011 book to the topic of death and mortality. We may also need to take seriously the philosophical 
significance of related religious concepts, such as sin and grace – or their secular analogies (though 
again this is not argued here). Death and guilt are joined into a single problem framework inviting 
not just a purely philosophical response but, possibly, a religious and/or theological one, even if 
one subscribes to no specifically religious worldviews. We just cannot completely ignore the role 
that religious concepts, or what originally were religious concepts, play, or may continue to play, in 
shaping our moral relations to the world and to our mortal lives.
15 Cf. Wittgenstein 1974 (1921), §5.6 ff.
16 See also, e.g., Pihlström 2001; 2011, chapter 3. This issue is closely connected with what J.J. 
Valberg argues in his intriguing book, Dream, Death, and Self (2007) – and with Johnston’s (2010) 
criticism of Valberg’s  employment of the notions of “horizon” and “arena.”
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the properly transcendental question (though he does not call it by that name) 
about the meaning of life, especially the meaning of morality, given the ineliminable 
facts of mortality and finitude.
Johnston begins from the observation that death is a threat to the “importance 
of goodness”.17 “Death is the great leveller; if the good and the bad alike go down 
into oblivion, if there is nothing about reality itself that shores up this basic moral 
difference between their lives, […] then the distinction between the good and the 
bad is less important. So goodness is less important.” (Ibid.). This serious threat 
is genuine even if moral considerations are regarded as “overriding,” because “we 
can ask about the importance of the moral point of view itself, given that reality – 
as depicted by secular naturalism – is indifferent to the very distinction that point 
of view treats as so important.” (Ibid., 8). The world itself seems to be “deaf” to the 
cries that injustice deserves punishment and goodness reward (ibid.). 
Johnston notes that he is not dealing with the Epicurean refutation of death at 
all. It is “simply not designed to address the threat death makes to the importance 
of goodness” (ibid., 13) – and here I fully agree. The Epicurean argument that the 
fear of death is irrational because death is “nothing for us” does not even begin to 
address this issue. Johnston wants to argue, however, that “there is something in 
death that is better for the good than for the bad”: “the good, but not the bad, can 
overcome death, in part by seeing through it” (ibid., 13–14). This will be a matter of 
degree, though, resulting from the fact that the good person “has undergone a kind 
of death of the self,” living a “transformed life driven by entering imaginatively into 
the lives of others,” as a “caretaker of humanity” (ibid.). This is a kind of personal 
identity different from the standard accounts focusing on the psychological 
continuity of the individual self. The good are not tied to any narrow identities of 
their own selves, so they can literally survive death. Yet, Johnston’s methodology – 
as well as his metaphysics – is completely naturalistic (ibid., 15–16; see also, e.g., 
291). He wants to rescue religious (or at least religious-sounding) ideas, including 
survival, from supernaturalism.
Moreover, he argues that supernaturalism is fundamentally irrelevant to this 
entire problem. There are no selves worth caring about, and the persons we 
are have a “Protean nature” (ibid., 292). We just cannot be supernaturalistically 
resurrected in the way religions suppose. Yet,
given the response-dependent element in personal identity, living out the ideal of agape 
would make us live on in the onward rush of humankind and not (or not especially) in 
the supernatural spaces of heaven, even if such spaces existed and were inhabited by 
inheritors of our souls.
Even if supernaturalism about death, say the existence of soul-inheritors in an afterlife, 
were literally true, this would be morally and religiously speaking a kind of distracting, 
17 Johnston 2010, 4. I will in this section cite Johnston’s book by providing the page numbers in the 
text.
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if not irritating, epiphenomenon. Our morally urgent postmortem future would remain 
here on earth in the onward rush of humankind. (Ibid., 293)
We couldn’t, then, he maintains, deserve heaven without remaining on earth (ibid., 
297). This is an idea I think we ought to find ethically persuasive.
Now the basic argument is that the good are better placed to face death as they 
are less attached to their individual personalities than those who are not good, 
and the individual personalities will indeed be obliterated in death. The good care 
about the flourishing of individual personality as such, not just about the flourishing 
of their own personality, and so they can face death more easily than the bad. And 
the really good – distinguished from the “reasonably good” – literally survive (ibid., 
318, and passim.).
But what is goodness, or good will, and who are the good? Good will, we are 
told, is “a fundamental disposition manifested in one’s style of practical reasoning 
and action,” “a disposition to absorb the legitimate interests of any present or future 
individual personality into one’s present practical outlook, so that those interests 
count as much as one’s own” (ibid., 332). So far so good, but what are legitimate 
interests? Our interests conflict, as we all know. Frankly, I am not at all sure how 
helpful this analysis is, practically speaking. Yet, the theoretical idea is perhaps 
the most important here. We need not know exactly what goodness is if we can 
still reasonably approximate it, and if we can thereby rationally hope for a kind of 
survival.
Johnston thus defends a “Religion of Humanity” (ibid., 339). The good can “see 
through death in a way that the utterly selfish cannot,” as the latter are attached 
to their individual personalities, which are all that really matters to them, and they 
are hence obliterated in death (ibid., 341). But, again, the nagging question returns: 
who are (the) good – not just “reasonably good” but genuinely, really good? Is 
anyone, or can anyone be, good in this sense? What Johnston here offers us is 
this: “The only place to begin that provides any chance of self-understanding is 
under the standing accusation that one’s own will is not a good will, along with the 
horror and self-disgust that this entails.” (Ibid., 341). This brings us back to our main 
theme, as death and guilt are, again, intimately related here: what I have above 
called transcendental guilt is the fundamentally life-transforming experience that 
my will is not a good will. I can try to approximate goodness and try to do what 
I can to take others’ interests into account (insofar as I understand what those 
interests are and am able to regard them as legitimate), but this task is, because of 
my necessary finitude, in a way impossible for me, because it is endless, infinite; 
I can never fully complete it. My apparently “moral” actions are often based on 
narcissistic motives, for instance (cf. ibid., 342), and even if this is not always the 
case, they always could be.
One key observation here is, then, that we never have legitimate reasons or 
full justification to believe that we are (morally) good, or even “good enough”. (If we 
claim we do, we fail to understand the demands of moral goodness.) We are, then, 
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inevitably guilty of failing to take others’ “legitimate interests” into account. Guilt 
and death remain a problem, or a set of intertwined problems, for us, threatening 
our ability to find meaning in goodness (insofar as it is a morally desirable ideal for 
us in our lives), even though the problem(s) could be resolved at an abstract level 
not really involving us. Or, more positively, goodness remains an infinite task for 
us. Precisely, therefore, guilt is a constitutive and thoroughgoing – transcendental 
– feature of our mortal lives.
This leads to a fundamental recognition of human finitude: as we (or I) never 
have sufficient reasons to believe in our (my) goodness, survival is for us (me) at 
best a mere hope – comparable to what Kant has to say on the question, “What 
may I hope?”, and the postulates of practical reason.18 Yet, perhaps this is sufficient 
for our being able to “look through” death (as Johnston suggests)? Perhaps such 
“looking through” is also a way of looking through our inevitable (transcendental) 
guilt, even though that guilt, any more than our mortality, can never be completely 
wiped away?
Death, Guilt, and the Meaning of Life
As a contrast to Johnston’s problematic argument, let us briefly turn to Merold 
Westphal’s discussion of the deep link between death and guilt.19 I have already 
discussed Westphal’s book in my Transcendental Guilt, as his is one of the very few 
philosophical inquiries that explicitly connect death with guilt. We may, in Kantian 
terms, follow Westphal in saying that the person who experiences guilt experiences 
not just (or perhaps not at all) unhappiness as such but the unworthiness of being 
happy. This highlights, according to Westphal, the intimate connection between 
moral guilt and the religious experience of sin or sinfulness (see ibid., 76; also 86-
87). Guilt, understood in this way, is a form of self-consciousness: “We have seen 
conscience as the self saying to itself, Thou art the man.” (Ibid., 81). Westphal 
summarizes this view as follows: “Objectively guilt is (1) liability to punishment. 
Subjectively it is (2) fear of punishment, and (3) approval of my own punishment, or, 
more carefully stated, approval of the other’s disapproval of me which may render 
me liable to punishment.” (Ibid., 89; see also 118). Religion both intensifies guilt 
– our guilt becomes truly metaphysical, that is, guilt in front of God – and offers, 
possibly, salvation.
Furthermore, Westphal plausibly argues that, especially when considered from 
a religious perspective, there is an intimate relation between the problems of guilt 
and death, and their human significance. In guilt, we may feel that our entire life has 
been in vain. For Tolstoy’s Ivan Ilyich, “the question of death is also the question 
18 Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason (1788) is the key reference here.
19 Westphal 1984. I will in this section cite Westphal’s book by providing the page numbers in the 
text.
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of guilt” (ibid., 93); death and guilt are essentially a “single concern” in religious life 
(ibid., 251). The story of Ivan Ilyich pictures death “as an enemy which (1) leads us 
to deceive ourselves, (2) robs us of the meaning of life, and (3) puts us in solitary 
confinement” (ibid., 90). Chapter 5 of Westphal’s book, “The Existential Meaning 
of Death” (ibid., 90–106), provides a detailed discussion of Tolstoy’s novella in the 
light of existential philosophy. “For Ivan, dying is an experience which exposes and 
intensifies the personal isolation of a life lived in the forgetfulness of death and 
guilt.” (Ibid., 94). 
When reflecting on our guilt from the perspective of our worthiness for happiness, 
we inevitably reflect on our life as a whole, on whether we have lived in vain. This 
brings the Wittgensteinian transcendental self, as a limit of the world (which is the 
same as life, as Wittgenstein announces in the Tractatus),20 back into the picture. It 
also brings the issue of death onto the agenda, as our life as a whole is obviously 
limited by birth and death. I find Westphal’s comments on the connection between 
these two fundamental issues highly important. The challenge, according to 
Westphal, is to deal with threatening ethical nihilism and existential anxiety (cf. ibid., 
99–101): our entire life, our guilty and mortal life, may lack meaning and worth in a 
fundamental sense, and this is something that the notion of transcendental guilt (in 
my vocabulary, not in Westphal’s) is intended to express.21 It is right here, according 
to Westphal, that the religious sense of these problems proves to be decisive: 
guilt and death represent “spiritual needs” – needs that are “higher” and “deeper” 
than the more mundane needs of happiness, such as health and wealth – linked 
in Martin Luther’s view, so that “[i]f sins are forgiven, death is gone” (ibid., 108). 
In different ways, different religious traditions (a phenomenological description of 
which is Westphal’s main goal) attempt to deal with these problems: “the religious 
life is attractive to the believing soul largely because of the hope that through a 
proper ‘relation’ to the Sacred guilt and death can be overcome” (ibid., 160).
Yet, a religiously conceived afterlife is not the crux of the matter from Ivan 
Ilyich’s point of view: “For only if there is a life free from self-deception, from guilt, 
and from loneliness in the crowd would any life after death be heaven instead of 
hell.” (Ibid., 94). This comes strikingly close to Johnston’s view: one cannot deserve 
any (religiously conceived) afterlife, or the prospect of such a life does not make 
any sense, morally speaking, if one fails to be “good” in a sense that finds any hope 
for an afterlife ultimately irrelevant. And Westphal goes on: “When death is looked 
squarely in the face, what is the meaning of this life, and how should it be lived? 
The answer to that question will be the key to any hopes and aspirations for what 
lies on the far side of death.” (Ibid., 95).
Heidegger can be seen as offering an (unacknowledged) commentary on Ivan 
Ilyich, because for both Heidegger and Tolstoy, “death individuates” (ibid., 96-97). 
20 See Wittgenstein 1974 (1921), § 5.621.
21 This cannot be applied to any (imagined) non-mortal being: arguably, only death limits our life 
into a whole whose meaning, value, or lack thereof can be examined. Only mortality provides a 
transcendental framework constitutive of the sense of such questions.
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Yet there is an important difference: for Tolstoy, it is “bitter loneliness”; for 
Heidegger, “an heroic human achievement” (ibid., 97).22 Death asks “whether we 
have acknowledged and accepted the freedom that we are and the responsibility 
that goes with it,” and whether we “have exercised such freedom wisely, lovingly, 
and honestly,” by fulfilling the task of becoming a self (ibid., 100). Through this 
existentialist approach to death, guilt – as well as, perhaps, regret – is again brought 
into the picture: “it is just at this point where the problems of guilt and death merge, 
that the problem of death becomes a fully human problem and my selfhood in the 
truest sense becomes involved” (ibid., 101). Thus, “death is finally a question of 
freedom rather than of necessity. That is to say, it is not a question about what will 
happen to me, but about what I will do with my life.” (Ibid., 102).
Hence, it is at the deepest level a question about my guilt, my life’s being morally 
structured in terms of transcendental guilt. For philosophical thanatology aiming at 
individual existential relevance, this moral structuring must, arguably, be examined 
from the perspective of a kind of methodological solipsism.
Other Emotional and Cognitive Responses
In order to enrich our picture of transcendental guilt, the relations between some 
other important emotions and/or experiential states, including cognitive states, that 
are invoked by death and/or mortality need to be considered. I will try to determine 
how far the transcendental vs. empirical distinction can be applied to these other 
emotions, analogously to the suggested application to guilt. I will not discuss the 
possibility of reducing these states to each other, though that may in some cases be 
an option; rather, I assume their autonomy and irreducibility in my brief comparative 
remarks. Obviously, again, my discussion does not aim at exhaustiveness. For 
instance, shame, a very important emotion in some ways close to guilt, will not be 
discussed here; it would deserve a special treatment of its own.
Let us take the cognitive responses to human mortality first – without postulating 
any fundamental boundary between the cognitive and the emotional, though. Our 
knowledge of death, especially of our own mortality, deserves detailed discussion in 
philosophical thanatology.23 The epistemology of death and mortality may operate, 
for instance, in terms of the distinction between intuitive (a priori) and empirical 
(say, inductive) knowledge about one’s own mortality. However, it may be asked 
whether there even can be any emotionally neutral knowledge about the “pure 
facts” of mortality. Is mortality more generally a critical test case for epistemologies 
22 In addition to Heidegger, Westphal comments on Karl Jaspers’s views on death in relation to 
Tolstoy’s story, invoking Jaspers’s notions such as boundary situations, existential awakening, etc. 
(1984, 98–99): “As I allow myself to become fully aware of death as a boundary situation it becomes 
‘a challenge … to live and to test my life in view of death.’” Then death becomes “the mirror of 
Existenz … the test that proves Existenz and relativizes mere existence.” (Ibid., 100). Westphal here 
cites Jaspers’s Philosophy II (1932/1970).
23 Cf. Schumacher 2010.
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allegedly focusing on our knowing “mere facts,” as distinguished from the emotional 
responses and attitudes those facts require from us, or the “moods” our encountering 
such facts in our lives may give rise to? Could it even be argued that, for instance, 
the continuous and ineliminable possibility of transcendental guilt must be present 
in all cognitive and/or epistemic attitudes to death and mortality (and, similarly, in 
any serious existential attitudes we may have to our lives)?
Secondly, turning back to emotions, fear and horror are of course very close to 
each other, both in general and as emotional responses to mortality in particular, 
but may nevertheless be distinguished: horror, unlike fear, often has no specific 
object – and is therefore more readily available to a transcendental account than 
(mere) fear. While it may be (empirically, factually) irrational to fear death, as has 
been argued since Lucretius’ Epicurean reflections on the matter, horror may be an 
inevitable emotional horizon for us at the transcendental level. Yet, admittedly, relief 
is also in many cases an appropriate emotional response to one’s, or someone 
else’s, death or anticipated death; however, one’s feeling of relief does not preclude 
one also being horrified – nor being guilty. Fear, furthermore, is clearly future-
directed, while horror need not be. In this respect, again, horror is more naturally 
available to a transcendental, as distinguished from an empirical/factual, treatment. 
While we may or may not fear what will happen to us in our future process of dying, 
we may face our present – and continuous – condition of being mortal with horror 
even when we are not afraid of anything in particular.
Thirdly, the anxiety or anguish arising from the inevitable prospect of one’s own 
death (captured in Heidegger’s famous notion, Sein-zum-Tode, or being-toward-
death) is not only connected with horror but seems to crucially invoke memory as 
well: remembering and missing the lived live – or, possibly, longing for the unlived, 
presumably only to be reached by imagination – contributes to our feeling anxious 
about our finitude. There is obviously a lot more that needs to be said about all 
these experiential states. Let me here just emphasize the way in which they invoke 
– or are perhaps, rather, invoked by – the cosmic challenge of human mortality we 
have discussed earlier, that is, the challenge that there is no objective meaning on 
the cosmic scale and therefore our lives are, ultimately, insignificant.24
Finally, yet another relevant emotion would be rejection or revolt. Geoffrey Scarre 
cites the famous poem by Dylan Thomas: “Do not go gentle into that good night, 
// Old age should burn and rave at close of day; // Rage, rage against the dying of 
the light. // Though wise men at their end know dark is right, // Because their words 
had forked no lightning they // Do not go gentle into that good night.”25 This is far 
from a Stoic acceptance and resignation: “Thomas urges us to reject [death] with 
anger.”26 This is a form of non-acceptance and life-affirmation – something that we 
24 Cf. Nagel 1979.




arguably also find in William James, and obviously in Miguel de Unamuno’s notion 
of the “tragic sense of life,” influenced by James.27
Our cosmic reflection invoked by anxiety and rejection eventually comes close 
to the mood of “ikävä” or “kaipuu” (longing) that the Finnish poet Eino Leino movingly 
describes in his poem, “Ikävöi ihminen” (“Long, man”). Leino notes that human 
beings may long for the possibility of living outside time entirely (which is clearly 
something for which imagination is needed): “Kaipaatko milloin sa ajan, paikan ja 
kuolonkin taaksi, istuen illoin, tuntien hiljaa maatuvas maaksi?” This yields what 
we may regard as the culmination of the poem: “Itketkö, ihminen, silloin kauneinta 
tiedon ja tunnon, hienointa sydämen, herkintä pyrkivän pyyteen ja kunnon?”28
Here, one’s anxiety, longing, or sorrow (and perhaps even mourning, whenever 
we have a specific life or death to be mourned, either our own or someone else’s) 
extends to human limits, finitude, and mortality generally: our most important 
and deepest cognitive, aesthetic, and ethical goals and ideals inevitably remain 
unrealized, or their realization is in any case only partial, contingent, temporary, 
and fragile; humanity as such, not merely individual human beings’ lives, is finite 
and vulnerable, falling desperately short of fully realizing its moral, intellectual, and 
all other aims and projects. This could also make the individual human being, each 
one of us, feel sorry for the general human condition (or, arguably, should do so). 
Or at least it may make us feel guilty about it, and feel guilty, perhaps even more 
guilty, if we do not feel sorry.
Does Death – Or Guilt – Make Us Equal?
The general human situation of transcendental guilt that has been articulated above 
can now be applied to a specific philosophical question central to thanatological 
investigations, namely, our fundamental equality vs. inequality in the face of death.
Death and mortality raise, rather obviously, difficult issues of social and 
political equality and inequality. People in different countries and different socio-
economic classes face their deaths – and the often painful processes of dying 
leading up to their deaths – in quite different ways. Differences in life expectancy 
and the availability of adequate medical services and end-of-life care tend to vary 
considerably, and increasingly, across socio-economic classes even in relatively 
“equal” and homogeneous societies (e.g., the Nordic welfare societies); typically, 
such variations are enormous in Third World countries. However, this socio-
economic-political notion of equality vs. inequality is not our main interest here. 
27 Cf. Ibid., 76. On James’s views on death, see Pihlström 2002. Cf. Unamuno 1913.
28 Free English translation: “Do you ever long to move beyond time, place, and even death, sitting 
still in the evening, feeling you are gradually decaying? […] Do you weep then, man, for the most 
beautiful feelings of knowledge and emotion, the finest feelings of the heart, the most sensitive 
emotions of pursuit and courage?”
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Instead, I want to, continuing my reflections on guilt, briefly discuss the topic of 
equality in a more metaphysical, or existential, sense.29 
Politically, inequality may be the problem, but existentially the situation may be 
the reverse: equality, rather than inequality, may be what troubles us in our relation 
to human mortality. As we saw, the view of death as the “great leveller” is the 
starting point of Johnston’s inquiry into the challenge that death is a threat to the 
“importance of goodness”.30 As I hope has become clear, I agree with him that we 
should not regard our lives as morally indifferent just because we die; yet, I disagree 
with him on the kind of solutions available to this ethically and metaphysically 
demanding problem. Let us, however, now consider some other dimensions of the 
equality (or inequality) of death and mortality, which will eventually bring us back to 
the topic of guilt.
We should note that the Epicurean and the so-called “privation view” theorist, 
whose positions define the basic opposition in the debate on the evil of death, in a 
way hold symmetrical views regarding our equality in the face of death – even though 
their controversy is one of the key issues in contemporary mainstream philosophy 
concerning death and dying. Either death is “nothing to us” because there will be 
no “us” anymore experiencing anything after death (just as, symmetrically, the time 
preceding our birth is not a bad thing, as there was no “us” then, either), as the 
Epicurean argues, following Lucretius’ famous formulation in De rerum natura. Or 
a “bad end is in store for us all,” as Thomas Nagel concludes his well-known essay, 
“Death” (1971),31 arguing for the view that death deprives us of things that could 
have been good in our lives had we not died. In both cases, dying and death do 
again make us equal. Admittedly, the privation theorist succeeds in saving some of 
the inequality we may find worth saving, as different lives are deprived of different 
things by death at the empirical level, but it does not follow that it succeeds in saving 
the ethically relevant sense of metaphysical inequality I am primarily interested in 
here. Again, the distinction between the empirical and the transcendental is crucial, 
and it seems to me that both the privation view and Epicureanism operate at the 
empirical/factual level without even raising their issues in a transcendental manner.
Therefore, I will not try to settle the debate between Epicurean and Nagelian (or 
other) views on the evil of death here.32 I just want to point out that both positions 
may – in my view because of their tendency to arrive at a metaphysically egalitarian 
conception of death – lead to the kind of moral nihilism we started from. As death, 
29 Such an approach to this issue may, I hope, be indirectly relevant to the more political questions 
of inequality as well. While I thus primarily continue to adopt the perspective of individualist ethics, 
the basic concerns raised regarding our equality in the face of death need to be addressed by 
anyone hoping to understand this phenomenon from the point of view of social ethics and political 
philosophy. For a more comprehensive investigation of the issue of metaphysical equality in relation 
to death, see Pihlström 2014.
30 Johnston 2010, 4.
31 Reprinted in Nagel 1979, chapter 1.
32 For relevant contributions, see, e.g., Fischer 1993.
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in a metaphysical sense, strikes us equally, saving no one, we may be led to think 
that nothing ultimately matters – whether or not that stroke is itself something bad 
or evil (Nagel’s privation view) or merely something indifferent (Epicureanism).
Another contemporary debate that seems to me to be neutral in relation to the 
equality vs. equality issue is that on the “tedium of immortality” launched by Bernard 
Williams’s essay, another modern classic of philosophy of death and dying.33 Those 
who argue, with Williams, that an immortal life would be boring because the one 
who lived forever would have time to do anything, and everything, and those who 
oppose this argument by pointing out that human beings could always ingenuously 
invent new activities and therefore immortality would be a good thing for us,34 seem 
to maintain that the inevitable tedium of immortality or, alternatively, the evil of 
death resulting from the fact that immortality would not necessarily be tedious but 
actually a good thing concern, in principle, all human beings equally. There could, 
however, be major individual differences in how the immortals could, for instance, 
rejuvenate their desires and invent new ways of life.35 
Let us take up a more literary – but for that reason no less philosophical – 
example. The British writer Julian Barnes, in his semi-autobiographical essayistic 
book dealing with death, Nothing to Be Frightened of (2008), discusses the peculiar 
situation of the writer positioned in a kind of gray area between being remembered 
and being forgotten (and this applies to anyone who writes, not just novelists but 
philosophers and other scholars as well). Just as death eventually equally concerns 
us all – though we can find highly personal responses to this universal human 
condition that is equally yours, mine, and ours, such as Barnes’s very elaborate 
self-reflection on his own peculiar fear of death – so does being forgotten. Barnes 
describes how the writer gradually falls into oblivion, until eventually “at some point 
– it must logically happen – a writer will have a last reader. […] At some point 
between now and the six-billion-years-away death of the planet, every writer will 
have his or her last reader.”36 And that final reader will die, too, though the speed 
at which one is forgotten of course varies significantly; as Barnes notes, “while, in 
the great democracy of readership, all are theoretically equal, some are more equal 
than others” (ibid., 226). Yet, at some point the last reader and her/his eventual 
death will hit us all.
33 Williams 1973.
34 See, e.g., Bruckner 2012.
35 As a side remark, I should point out that I find Bruckner’s position utterly implausible, because it 
hardly makes sense to speak about the rejuvenation of human desires or the invention of new ways 
of spending time in the context of an imagined situation of immortality in which human life would 
no longer have the kind of natural limitations we know it to have, limitations that largely define the 
ways in which we take our lives to be capable of making sense, or of failing to do so. This, however, 
is not the topic of the present essay. In any case, Bruckner 2012 is helpful also because the paper 
summarizes much of the literature responding to Williams’s original paper.
36 Barnes 2008, 225. I will in this section cite Barnes’s book by providing the page numbers in the 
text.
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Barnes observes that we might want to be sentimental about our last readers 
– until we realize that there is no good reason for that: “[…] your last reader is, 
by definition, someone who doesn’t recommend your books to anyone else. You 
bastard! Not good enough, eh? You prefer that trivial stuff […]? I was about to 
mourn your passing, but I’m getting over it fast. You’re really not going to press my 
book on anyone else? […] Then you don’t deserve me. Go on, fuck off and die. Yes, 
you.” (Ibid.). Furthermore, just as necessarily as every writer will have her or his last 
reader, every grave – and in that sense every human being who lived and died – 
will have the last visitor. So this is another kind of equality in the face of death, the 
final posthumous equality:
So here’s another logical inevitability. Just as every writer will have a last reader, so 
every corpse will have a last visitor. By whom I don’t mean the man driving the earth-
digger who scoops out your remnants when the graveyard is sold off for suburban 
housing. I mean that distant descendant; or, in my own case, the gratifyingly nerdy 
(or, rather, charmingly intelligent) graduate student – still bibliophilic long after reading 
has been replaced by smarter means of conveying narrative, thought, emotion – who 
has developed a quaint and lonely (or rather, entirely admirable) attachment to long-
forgotten novelists of the distant Print Era. (Ibid., 248)
For some of us it might just be the man driving the earth-digger, but for each of 
us it is someone. There is no way of escaping the last visit. Again, whether or not 
this is a bad end (and it is, necessarily, a posthumous end), it is certainly in store 
for us all.
However, we clearly want our lives to be relevant to how we face death, and 
vice versa. While we may want to fight political and economic inequalities inherent 
in our practices of dealing with processes of dying, we hardly want death itself, 
and hence life, to make us “completely equal.” This is because otherwise nothing 
matters – the way we live and face death won’t matter – and therefore life, like 
death, collapses into absurdity. This is the kind of equality, the equality of moral 
nihilism, that we must, for ethical reasons, avoid. 
What we should observe here is that the metaphysics of death ought to be 
based on ethics – this is something that I cannot argue here but that could be 
argued, for example, on the basis of a pragmatist approach to metaphysics.37 What 
a metaphysical investigation of death and mortality comes down to according to 
such a pragmatist proposal is an ethical investigation of what it would mean for 
a human being to live in a world in which the relevant metaphysical conceptions 
of death and mortality would be true.38 In particular, whether death equalizes our 
lives in the sense of the “equality of moral nihilism,” as we may fear, is a crucial 
question that may shape our entire lives; it makes a fundamental difference to us 
whether we take the world to be such a nihilistic place or not. Directing attention to 
37 As proposed in, e.g., Pihlström 2009.
38 See also Hobbs 2011.
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the ethical pictures that inevitably influence our metaphysical reflections is itself an 
ethical must. The ethical quality of one’s life determines, or ought to determine, how 
exactly, and indeed whether, death matters to the particular person whose life is at 
stake. The premise here is, of course, that it does matter; the argument says that it 
can matter only if the ethical dimension of our metaphysical commitments is taken 
seriously. We need to explore the metaphysical implications of this transcendental-
sounding argument. Such an exploration is, I would like to suggest, an instance 
of the “pragmatic method” applied to metaphysical problems – as proposed by 
William James, among others.39
We may distinguish different ways of developing this idea, such as Johnston’s 
above-discussed view on the “survival of the good” and Terry Eagleton’s account of 
evil as a certain kind of inability to face or accept one’s own death and mortality.40 
My critical discussion of Johnston should be seen as an attempt to contribute to 
this exploration of the ethical basis of metaphysical views of death and mortality. 
Equipped with our transcendental account of the relation between death and guilt 
we might conclude that it is guilt that makes us fundamentally equal in the face 
of death. Guilt in this metaphysically pregnant sense – a transcendental sense, 
as I prefer to describe it – is, I have argued, ineliminably present in the question 
concerning the ethical meaning of life. Death makes us ask whether we have lived 
rightly or wrongly. The urgency of this question makes us equal, although our 
different individual answers to it may lead to extremely unequal lives.
On the other hand, guilt, as existentialist thinkers have recognized at least since 
Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit (1927),41 and indeed earlier, individualizes us, makes 
our moral problems truly ours. And so does death. This is why it was necessary 
to examine Westphal’s approach to the existential meaning of death and guilt, 
epitomized in the question of whether one’s life is completely “in vain.”42 We again 
arrive at the conclusion that it is in relation to the question concerning the very 
meaningfulness or meaninglessness of life – a question inextricably intertwined with 
the question of guilt, with the possibility of our life having been a wrong kind of life 
entirely – that we are equal in the face of death. Yet this fundamental equality leads 
to the possibility of arriving at very different (hence “unequal”) moral responses 
to life and death. Those who recognize their guilt and engage in existential self-
reflection may be able to face death quite differently from those who find nothing 
wrong in their lives and are unable to accept their finitude. The equality is in the 
way life and death challenge us to reflection; the individual differences can be 
39 James 1975 (1907), chapters 3–4.
40 See Eagleton 2010.
41 See Heidegger 1961 (1927).
42 For another highly illuminating discussion of this fundamental challenge that death poses us, 
that is, that we may have “lived wrongly,” see Schneider 1981 (also referring, like Westphal, to 
Tolstoy’s Ivan Ilyich).
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found in those reflections themselves and in the kind of lives, and deaths (as well 
as, perhaps, dyings), they yield.
Insofar as we find guilt central, or even constitutive, in the conceptual network 
explored here, we should also keep in mind that there is a sense in which guilt, 
though social, is deeply “first-personal” (cf. above). According to Dostoevsky, every 
human being is guilty for the sins of the entire humankind – and I am more guilty 
than anyone else. (This theme runs through many of Dostoevsky’s major novels, 
including The Brothers Karamazov in particular.) Thus, there is a tension here 
between equality and inequality. In a sense guilt equalizes; humanity as such is 
equally faced with the question of whether life is fundamentally wrong or “in vain.” 
At the same time, this horizon of guilt dawns on each one of us (equally) individually 
and personally, concerning me first and foremost. There is no way of sharing this 
kind of guilt; it is mine. This dialectic between “first-personal” and “third-personal” 
ways of understanding guilt might in fact be seen as analogous to the similar kind of 
dialectic, or tension, between the first- and third-personal ways of relating to death.
Conclusion
Through a transcendental consideration of the different emotions characterized 
above, we may again arrive at the insight – though this is not explicitly part of Eino 
Leino’s poem cited above – that guilt is essential in our entire network of emotional 
responses to mortality. At least guilt needs to be considered in any attempt to 
examine, with Johnston, whether death is a “threat to the importance of goodness.” 
It also needs to be considered in any attempt to determine whether we are in a 
fundamental way equal in the face of death or whether the moral status of our 
lives actually makes a difference in how death matters to us. The reflections of 
this paper have barely begun what a more comprehensive account would seek to 
accomplish: a transcendental examination of human finitude and finality, and their 
“meaning-threatening” nature, both personally and generally.
This human finitude is not just a contingent limitation of a natural creature, 
although it is of course that, too. Just as guilt, I have argued, is a constitutive 
element of morality – to the extent that it can be regarded as transcendentally 
constitutive of the moral point of view itself – so mortality, leading us to the 
guilt-invoking question of whether we have lived wrongly, is a transcendentally 
constitutive feature of humanity. This may come close to the Heideggerian view of 
being-unto-death as an existential feature of human being-in-the-world. Preferring 
to avoid the Heideggerian terminology, however, I believe we could speak about 
the transcendentally, and hence metaphysically, necessary character of human 
mortality. While our mortality in the biological sense is, of course, a mere natural 
necessity, comparable to the necessity of the laws of nature (however that necessity 
in the last analysis ought to be construed), this natural fact about us manifests a 
deeper metaphysical necessity. Without being mortal we would not, and could not, 
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be the kind of beings we are – namely, human beings – and without being able 
to live in the horizon of guilt we would not, and could not, be the kind of ethically 
engaged beings that we, inevitably, find ourselves being. Guilt and death, then, 
define us in a way that goes beyond mere natural facts about human biology.
As a social emotion par excellence – despite its deep first-personal nature – 
guilt also highlights the ways in which we as mortal subjects are “transcendentally 
constituted” through certain basic (metaphysical) relations to other subjects, 
relations that are, precisely in their metaphysical constitutivity, also ethical. That 
is, we may say that we are transcendentally constituted through our relations of 
recognition or acknowledgment to other mortal selves, including especially relations 
of mutual recognition of the other’s mortality.43 Without this community of mortals 
capable of guilt there would hardly be human life as we know it. Again we are not 
dealing with merely contingent natural and/or social facts about human existence 
but with more deeply metaphysical – transcendental – features that nevertheless 
need to be manifested in natural circumstances and processes of life (and death).
The metaphysics of death clearly needs further philosophical attention in 
relation to the ethics of death; more generally, ethics and metaphysics cannot 
eventually be dichotomously separated. This also concerns guilt, transcendentally 
analyzed. We are, I have suggested, guilty in a transcendental sense, even if we 
are not “factually” (empirically) guilty of anything in particular, and therefore our 
mortality and finitude, as ethico-metaphysical elements or characteristics of our 
common humanity, make us anxious about our lives as wholes, and about human 
life in general. Furthermore, while both death and guilt are something universally 
human, their capacity of being shared is, as we have noted, also severely limited: 
each one of us must face them – in the transcendental sense – individually, or even 
solipsistically.
The notion of the transcendental self (or transcendental subject), understood as 
a “limit” of the world in the Wittgensteinian sense, therefore crucially deepens our 
understanding of death and guilt, though it hardly leads us to anything like adequate 
comprehension of this perennial mystery. Appreciating this insight is an important 
step in the process of coming to appreciate the universal human significance of 
one’s (my) death not being just another event among others in the world but the (or, 
acknowledging otherness, an) end of the world.44
43 This essay is not the right place to invoke theories of recognition in general (cf. Honneth 2005), 
but in principle my treatment of death and guilt could be enriched by introducing the vocabulary of 
recognition into this context. The mortal other needs recognition, and failures of recognition are an 
obvious source of guilt.
44 An early version of this paper was presented in the symposium, Death and Emotions, organized 
by the Argumenta Project “Human Mortality” (funded by the Finnish Cultural Foundation) at the 
Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies in November, 2011. I am grateful to the audience for 
valuable critical remarks. The topic of the final substantial section discussing death and equality is 
more comprehensively addressed in Pihlström 2014. For another related recent investigation of the 
same topics, cf. Pihlström 2015.
Death and Mortality – From Individual to Communal Perspectives
136
References
Barnes, J. 2008. Nothing to Be Frightened of. London: Jonathan Cape.
Bruckner, D.W. 2012. Against the Tedium of Immortality. International Journal of Philosophical 
Studies 20, 623–644.
Carr, D. 1999. The Paradox of Subjectivity: The Self in the Transcendental Tradition. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Eagleton, T. 2010. On Evil. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Fischer, J.M. (ed.) 1993. The Metaphysics and Ethics of Death. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press.
Heidegger, M. 1961 (1927). Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer.
Hobbs, C.A. 2011. Why Classical Pragmatism Is Helpful for Thinking about Death. Transactions 
of the Charles S. Peirce Society 47, 182–195.
Honneth, A. 2005. Kampf um Anerkennung. Revised ed. (1st ed. 1992). Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp. 
James, W. 1975 (1907). Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking. Eds. F.H. 
Burkhardt, F. Bowers & I.K. Skrupskelis. Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University 
Press.
Johnston, M. 2010. Surviving Death. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kant, I. 1788. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. In W. Weischädel (ed.) Immanuel Kant: Werke in 
Zehn Bänden. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
Lucretius. On the Nature of Things / De rerum natura. Available online, e.g. here: ttp://classics.
mit.edu/Carus/nature_things.html (visited 1 July 2015).
Margalit, A. 2002. The Ethics of Memory. Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press.
Nagel, T. 1979. Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pihlström, S. 2001. Death – Mine or the Other’s? On the Possibility of Philosophical Thanatology. 
Mortality 6, 265–286.
Pihlström, S. 2002. William James on Death, Mortality, and Immortality. Transactions of the 
Charles S. Peirce Society 38. Reprinted (in an enlarged form) in S. Pihlström, “The Trail 
of the Human Serpent Is over Everything”: Jamesian Perspectives on Mind, World, and 
Religion. Lanham, MD: University Press of America (Rowman & Littlefield Publishing 
Group), 2008, chapter 3.
Pihlström, S. 2003. Naturalizing the Transcendental: A Pragmatic View. Amherst, NY: 
Prometheus/Humanity Books.
Pihlström, S. 2009. Pragmatist Metaphysics: An Essay on the Ethical Grounds of Metaphysics. 
London: Continuum.
Pihlström, S. 2011. Transcendental Guilt: Reflections on Ethical Finitude. Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books (Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group).
Pihlström, S. 2014. Does Death Make Us Equal? Philosophy Today 58, 163–177.
Pihlström, S. 2015. Controlling Death: Pragmatism Meets Philosophical Thanatology. Mortality 
20, 48–66.
Sorabji, R. 2006. Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Scarre, G. 2007. Death. Stocksfield: Acumen.




Schumacher, B.N. 2010. Death and Mortality in Contemporary Philosophy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
de Unamuno, M. 1913. Tragic Sense of Life. Trans. J.E. Crawford Flitch. New York: 
Dover, 1954. Available online at Project Gutenberg: http://archive.org/stream/
tragicsenseoflif14636gut/14636.txt (visited 1 July 2015).
Valberg, J.J. 2007. Dream, Death, and Self. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Westphal, M. 1984. God, Guilt, and Death: An Existential Phenomenology of Religious 
Experience. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Williams, B. 1973. The Makropoulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality. In B. 
Williams, Problems of the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 82–100.
Wittgenstein, L. 1921 (1974). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trans. D.F. Pears & B.F. 
McGuinness. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
